Evolution of U.S. Electric Energy Regulation: From Natural Monopoly Regulation to Regulated Competition by Allison, Gary
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
2014
Evolution of U.S. Electric Energy Regulation: From
Natural Monopoly Regulation to Regulated
Competition
Gary Allison
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evolution of U.S. Electric Energy Regulation: From Natural Monopoly Regulation to Regulated Competition, ABA's Section of
Environment, Energy & Resources (2014).
Allison-Page 1 of 30 
 
Evolution of U.S. Electric Energy Regulation: 
From Natural Monopoly Regulation to Regulated Competition 
 
by 
 
Gary D. Allison 
Professor of Law, Director-Sustainable Energy & Resources Law Program 
The University of Tulsa College of Law 
 
Abstract:  Regulation of the interstate wholesale electric energy industry has evolved from cost of service 
regulation to regulated completion. This article presents an overview of the key means by which the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission brought regulated competition to interstate wholesale electric 
energy markets by unbundling electric energy generation from electric energy delivery (transmission and 
distribution) and limiting the opportunities of electric energy providers to exercise market power. 
 
Key Terms:  affiliate restrictions; ancillary services; auction revenue rights (ARRs); congestion; day-
ahead spot market; demand response; distribution; generation; financial transmission rights(FTRs); 
locational marginal pricing (LMP); market behavior rules; market manipulation; market monitoring; 
market power; network integration service; open access same-time information systems (OASIS); open 
access transmission tariff (OATT); point-to-point service; real-time spot market; regional transmission 
organizations (RTOS); transmission; unbundling; variable energy resources (VERs); vertically integrated 
utilities (VIUs) 
 
I. Introduction 
The United States electric energy industry has been dominated by vertically integrated 
utilities (VIUs) regulated on a cost-of-service basis with the goal of insuring that end-users 
receive non-discriminatory reliable service at just and reasonable rates.1  From the late 1960s 
through the mid-1990s, VIUs cost of service skyrocketed because they and their regulators 
consistently failed to anticipate technological, economic and legal changes.2  In response to 
                                                 
1 David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767–770 (2008) 
[hereinafter Spence]; Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA's Gone: What Is Next For Holding 
Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1, 7, 11, 12 (2006).  
  
2 In the 1960s through the 1970s, many vertically integrated electric energy utilities (VIUs), with the approval of 
their regulators, constructed large capital-intensive base-load power plants that proved to be uneconomic due to 
unforeseen cost increases and a slowing of electric energy demand growth.   Promoting Wholesale Competition 
through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662, 17,668–17,669 (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
April 7, 1995) [hereinafter OATTs NOPR]; MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, A 
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF U.S. ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING WITH POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 
FUTURE, 7-8  (National Council on Electricity Policy; June, 2003), 
http://www.ncouncil.org/Documents/restruc.pdf  (last visited June 22, 2013) [hereinafter NCEP OPTIONS].  The 
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outraged end-users,3 and cost-of-service/Natural Monopoly Theory critics4, the federal 
government through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has replaced natural monopoly 
regulation with regulation competition in interstate electric energy wholesale markets.   
Regulated competition advocates believed that competitive electric energy markets could 
be developed if VIUs’ generating facilities were unbundled from their delivery facilities 
(transmission and distribution) so electric energy vendors and customers could have non-
discriminatory access to the VIUs’ delivery systems.5  Responding to this belief, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) imposed unbundling on wholesale electric energy 
markets and all interstate transmission not associated with bundled retail sales. VIUs were 
                                                                                                                                                             
unforeseen cost increases were caused by the combined effects of high inflation, high interest rates, two energy price 
shocks, and the Three Mile Island nuclear power incident.  OATTs NOPR, supra at 17,669 & n. 47;  NCEP 
OPTIONS, supra at 7-8.  Electric energy demand growth fell due to a sluggish economy and energy conservation 
efforts.   OATTs NOPR, supra at 17,669.    
 
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, many VIUs entered into long-term contracts to purchase electric energy from 
new classes of non-utility generators (Qualifying Facilities-QFs, Independent Power Producers-IPPs, and Affiliated 
Power Producers-APPs) at market-based wholesale prices that proved to be uneconomic due to unforeseen 
economic, technological, and energy market developments.  See OATTs NOPR, supra at 17,669-17,671, 17,674; 
NCEP OPTIONS, supra. at 8, 10, 11; Charles E. Bayless, Less Is More: Why Gas Turbines Will Transform Electric 
Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 21 (Dec. 1, 1994). 
     
3 Industrial users first sought and won preferential rates, NCEP OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 3, and then they began 
self-generating and seeking competitive options. OATTs NOPR, supra note 2, at 17,669.  These strategies reduced 
the electric energy sales of the VIUs, so rates charged to remaining customers increased to cover the utilities’ fixed 
costs.  JEFFREY DASOVICH, WILLIAM MEYER, VIRGINA A. COE, CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRIC SERVICES INDUSTRY:  
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST, STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 102 (1993), available at 
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/Restructuring%20Archive/Yellow_book.pdf (last visited June 29, 2013) [hereinafter 
CALIFORNIA REPORT].   In the early 1990s, the large industrial customers and others began to demand a restructuring 
of retail and wholesale electric energy markets.  Id. at 102, 123-133; NCEP OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 11, 22. 
 
4 See See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J. L. & ECON. 55, 56-65 (1968) [asserting that competitive 
bid-for-the market mechanisms could effectively replace cost-of-service regulation]; Stephen Breyer, Analyzing 
Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 552, 562-564 (1979) 
[documenting market distortions caused by cost-of-service regulation]; Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of Natural 
Monopoly, Vol. 9, No. 2 THE REVIEW OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 43 44-50, 53, 54 (1996) [asserting that Natural 
Monopoly Theory was a false doctrine because natural monopolies never existed and that “public utility rate 
regulation is an anti-consumer monopolistic, price-fixing scheme]. 
 
5 See, OATTs NOPR, supra note 2, at 17,668–17,669;  THE ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY:  PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 1815 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 21-27 (2007), available at  http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-
sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf [last visited June 29, 2013] [hereinafter COMPETITION REPORT]; NCEP OPTIONS, 
supra note 15, at 22; CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 125-125, 188.  
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functionally unbundled through Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) regulation.6 
Operational unbundling has been achieved in some regions through regulations designed to 
encourage voluntary formation and effective operation of Independent Systems Operators (ISOs) 
and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).7 Competitive electric energy markets have 
been fostered through regulations designed to eliminate or mitigate uncompetitive practices.8 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Major FERC OATT orders include: Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmission Utilities 
(Order No. 888), 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540,  21,551-21,552 (April 24, 1996) [hereinafter Order 888]; Open Access Same-
Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct (Order No. 889), 
61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (April 24, 1996) [hereinafter Order 889]; Standardization of Generator Interconnection 
Agreements and Procedures (Order No. 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 49,846 (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Order 2003]; 
Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures (Order No. 2006), 70 Fed. Reg. 
34,190 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter Order 2006]; Interconnection for Wind Energy (Order No. 661), 70 Fed. Reg. 
34,993 (June 2, 2005) [hereinafter Order 661]; Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform (Order 
No. 679), 71 Fed. Reg. 43,294 (July 20, 2006) [hereinafter Order 679]; Preventing Undue Discrimination and 
Preference in Transmission Service (Order No. 890), 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Feb. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Order 890]; 
Standards of Conduct for Transmission Providers (Order No. 717), 73 Fed. Reg. 63,796 (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter 
Order 717]; Promoting a Competitive Market for Capacity Reassignments (Order No. 739), 75 Fed. Reg. 58,293 
(September 20, 2010) [hereinafter Order 739]; Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities (Order No. 1000), 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Order 1000]; 
Integration of Variable Energy Resources (Order No. 764), 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482 (June 22, 2012) [hereinafter Order 
764]; Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting for New Electric Storage 
Technologies (Order No. 784), 78 Fed. Reg. 46,178 (July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Order 784]. 
 
7 Major ISO/RTO orders include:  Regional Transmission Organizations (Order No. 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (Dec. 
20, 1999) [hereinafter Order 2000]; Long-Term Firm Transmission Rights in Organized Markets (Order No. 681), 
71 Fed. Reg. 43,564 (July 20, 2006) [hereinafter Order 681]; Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized 
Electric Markets (Order No. 719), 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Order 719]; Demand Response 
Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets (Order No. 745), 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (March 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter Order 745]; Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets (Order 
No. 755), 76 Fed. Reg. 67,260 (Oct 20, 2011) [hereinafter Order 755]. 
 
8 Major interstate wholesale electric market competition orders include:  Order Amending Market-Based Rate 
Tariffs and Authorizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,902 (Nov. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Market Behavior Order]; Prohibition 
of Energy Market Manipulation (Order No. 670), 71 Fed. Reg. 4244 (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Order 670]; 
Conditions for Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorization Holders (Order No. 674), 71 Fed. Reg. 9695 (Feb. 
16, 2006) [hereinafter Order 674]; Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and 
Ancillary Services by Public Utilities (Order No. 697), 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904 (June 21, 2007) [hereinafter Order 697]; 
Order 719, supra note 7. 
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II. Operational Unbundling:  Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) 
The FERC initiated Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) regulation by adopting a 
pro-forma OATT (OATT).9  It requires VIUs to (1) “take transmission services (including 
ancillary services) for all of its new wholesale sales and purchases of energy under the same 
tariff of general applicability as do others;” (2) “state separate rates for wholesale generation, 
transmission, and ancillary services;” and (3) “rely on the same electronic information network 
that its transmission customers rely on to obtain information about its transmission system when 
buying or selling power.”10 
A. Information Equality   
The FERC required transmission providers to provide on an equal basis essential 
information about the services they offer and the transfer capacity of their transmission systems 
by developing and using online Open Access Same-Time Information Systems (OASIS) and 
operating in accordance with mandated Standards of Conduct.11     Subsequently, the FERC 
ordered transmission providers to improve the calculation and reporting of their available 
transfer capacity (ATC)—the amount of electric energy that can be moved reliably from one area 
                                                 
9 The latest FERC Pro Forma OATT is FERC, PRO FORMA OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF, 
available at Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) Reform, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/oatt-reform.asp (follow Order No. 890-B Rehearing Order pro 
forma OATT doc hyperlink), (hereinafter PRO FORMA OATT) [last visited August 2, 2013]. 
 
10 Order 888, supra note 6, at 21,552; Order 890, supra  note 6, at 12,284, 12,285. 
 
11 Order 888, supra note 6, at at 21,740-21743, 21,748-21,762.  Required information includes transfer capability 
data for each transmission network path of interest, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(b), transmission services and prices, 18 C.F.R. 
§ 37.5(c), ancillary services and prices, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(d), data about the nature and ultimate fate of specific 
transmission and ancillary service requests, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(e), transmission service schedules, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(f), 
other transmission related communications, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(g), summaries of the time to complete transmission 
service request studies, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(h), data concerning the number of transmission service requests that have 
been granted and denied by path or flowgate, 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(i), and redispatch data. 18 C.F.R. § 37.5(j).  
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to another on transmission systems after all committed uses are accommodated.12  The FERC 
also issued modified Standards of Conduct so that transmission providers must ensure that their 
transmission operations employees function independently of electric energy marketing 
employees or those of affiliates, not use conduits to disclose non-public transmission operations 
information to their own electric marketing employees or those of their affiliates, and operate 
transparently. 13  
B. OATT Transmission Services 
Transmission providers must offer 3 services:  firm point-to-point, non-firm point-to-
point and network integration.14  Point-to-point service entitles the transmission customer to 
receive electric capacity and energy at designated points of receipt and deliver that electric 
capacity and energy to designated points of delivery.15  Network integration (network) service 
entitles network service customers to deliver to their Network Loads (electric energy customers) 
                                                 
12 The FERC was ordered to work with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the North 
American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) to develop “a more coherent and uniform determination of ATC across 
a region . . ..”  Order 890, supra note 6, at 12,298.  This improvement was required because the FERC found 
potential for undue discrimination from “(1) Variability in the calculation of the components that are used to 
determine ATC and (2) the lack of a detailed description of the ATC calculation methodology and the underlying 
assumptions used by the transmission provider.”  Id. at 12,296. 
 
13 In Order 889, the FERC recognized that Standards of Conduct were needed to “to ensure that Transmission 
Providers do not use their unique access to information unfairly to favor their own merchant functions, or those of 
their affiliates, in selling electric energy in interstate commerce.”  Order 889, supra note 6, at 21,743-21,748.  The 
FERC issued the modified code in 2008.  Order 717, supra note 6, at 63,801-63, 816 (Independent Function Rule, 
now codified at 18 C.F.R § 358.5), 63,816-63,817 (No Conduit Rule now codified at 18 C.F.R. § 358.6), 63,817-
63,922 (Transparency Rule now codified at 18 C.F.R. § 358.7).  The Transparency Rule requires transmission 
providers to post on their websites in a timely fashion information that could be relevant in mitigating or preventing 
anticompetitive exchanges of information between employees performing transmission functions and employees and 
affiliate employees engaged in marketing functions .  Order 717, supra. note 6, at 63,817-63,822. 
 
14 Order 888, supra note 6, at 21,572; Order 890, supra  note 6, at 12,283, 12,284.  
 
15 PRO FORMA OATT, supra note 9, at §1.37& Part II preamble.  Sections relevant to firm point-to-point service 
include, id. at §§ §§ 13.2(iv), 13.5 (entitlement to system expansion), 13.6 (preferred curtailment priority), 13.7(c) 
(entitlement of firm delivery of capacity and energy).  Note, the minimum term of firm point-to-point service is one 
day, and the maximum term is negotiable.  Id. at § 13.1.  Long-Term firm point-to-point service is for a term > 1 
year.  Id. at § 1.19.  Sections relevant to non-firm point-to-point service include:  §§ 1.28, 14.2, 14.5, 14.7 (low 
curtailment priority).  Note, non-firm point to point service has a minimum term of 1 hour and a maximum term of 1 
month,  id. at § 14.1, but sequential terms can be reserved.  Id. at §§ 14.1, 18.3. 
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on a firm basis electric capacity and energy supplied by integrating, dispatching and regulating 
their Network Resources (generation) in a manner comparable to how a VIU delivers to its 
wholesale and retail customers (Native Load) electric capacity and energy supplied by its fleet of 
generators.16  The OATT details the characteristics of these services and how each is to be 
initiated and provided. 
C. OATT Ancillary Services 
The OATT also specifies how seven ancillary services must be provided, including: (1) 
scheduling, system control and dispatch; (2) reactive supply and voltage control; (3) regulation 
and frequency response; (4) energy imbalance; (5) spinning reserve; (6) supplemental reserve, 
and (7) generator imbalance.17  Transmission providers must insure the provision of the first two 
                                                 
16 PRO FORMA OATT, supra note 9, at §§ 28.1, 28.3, and Part III preamble.  Network resources are generating 
resources owned, purchased or leased by a network customer that are designated for serving its network load under a 
Network Transmission Service Tariff.  Id. at § 1.26.  Network loads are all loads served by the network customer’s 
network resources.  Id. at §§ 1.23, 28.1, 31.3.  Native Load consists of the wholesale and retail power customers to 
whom transmission providers are obligated “by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract” to construct 
and operate transmission systems to meet their “reliable electric needs.”  Id. at § 1.20.  
 
17 The first 6 ancillary services were mandated in Order 888, supra note 6, at 21,579-21,590.  The seventh was 
added in Order 890, supra  note 6, at 12,344-12,349.  System Control and Dispatch Service “provides for (i) 
interchange schedule confirmation and implementation with other control areas, including intermediary control areas 
that are providing transmission service, and (ii) actions to ensure operational security during the interchange 
transaction.”   Order 888, supra note 6, at 21,581.  Reactive Supply and Voltage Support involves the injection or 
absorption of reactive power to maintain transmission-system voltages within required ranges.  BRENDAN KIRBY, 
ANCILLARY SERVICES:  TECHNICAL AND COMMERCIAL INSIGHTS 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.science.smith.edu/~jcardell/Courses/EGR325/Readings/Ancillary_Services_Kirby.pdf [last visited July 
19, 2013] [hereinafter ANCILLARY INSIGHTS].  See Order 888, supra note 6, at 21,581-21,582.  Regulation and 
Frequency Response Service involves regulating the balance of energy and load in order to maintain scheduled 
interconnection frequency at 60 Hz.  Id. at 21,582.  Energy Imbalance Service “makes up for any difference that 
occurs over a single hour between the scheduled and the actual delivery of energy to a load located within its control 
area”  Order 890, supra note 6, at 12,344.  Spinning Reserve is the provision of “generating units that are on-line and 
loaded at less than maximum output [so t]hey are available to serve load immediately in an unexpected contingency, 
such as an unplanned outage of a generating unit.” Id.  Supplemental Reserve is the capability to serve load in an 
unexpected contingency by generating units that are on-line but unloaded, by quick-start generation, and by 
customer-interrupted load, i.e., curtailing load by negotiated agreement with a customer to correct an imbalance 
between generation and load rather than increasing generation output.”  Id.  Generator Imbalance Service makes up 
for the “differences between energy scheduled for delivery from a generator and the amount of energy actually 
generated in an hour.”  Id. 
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ancillary services and must offer to insure the provision of the remaining ancillary services.18   
Transmission customers must acquire the first two ancillary services through their transmission 
provider, but they may self-supply the remaining ancillary services, or acquire them from their 
transmission providers or third parties, as long as they are comparable in reliability as the 
services that the transmission provider would have provided.19  Ancillary services may be 
acquired from non-generation sources such as demand response resources owned by electric 
energy end-users.20  
Energy and generator imbalances—the failure of loads and/or electric energy suppliers to 
take or generate electric energy at pre-scheduled hourly levels21—increase the need for many 
ancillary services.22  To encourage loads and suppliers to stay in balance, the FERC authorized 
transmission providers to levy imbalance charges.23 Subsequently, the FERC imposed a 
standardized three tier imbalance charge schedule to replace the confusingly diverse and often 
ineffective imbalance charges being levied.24  The FERC has since reduced electric energy 
                                                 
18 PRO FORMA OATT, supra note 9, at § 3.   
 
19 Id. 
 
20 Order 890, supra  note 6, at 12,378-12,379. 
 
21 Id. at 12,344. 
 
22 See ANCILLARY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 1, 7. 
 
23 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public 
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (Order No. 888-A), 62 Fed. Reg. 
12,274, 12,306-12,307 (March 4, 1997) [hereafter 888-A]. 
 
24 Order 890, supra  note 6, at 12,349, providing narrative descriptions providing date for table below: 
 
 
oversched undersched
Tier % sched. Energy MW % decrem costs % increm costs
1 1.5 2 100 100
2 1.5 to 7.5 2 to 10 90 110
3 > 7.5 10 75 125
+ bandwith: the > of
imbalance charge
Imbalance Charges by Tiers
Allison-Page 8 of 30 
 
providers’ exposure to generator imbalance charges by permitting electric energy providers to 
change their scheduled generation output at 15 minute intervals.25 
 The FERC has recently amended the OATT to make it easier for transmission customers 
or third parties to provide Regulation/Frequency Response (RFR)—achieving the minute-by-
minute energy/load balance required to maintain grid frequency at 60 Hz.26  Transmission 
providers must take into account the speed and accuracy of regulation resources in determining 
reserve requirements for RFR when determining whether a self-supplying transmission customer 
has made “alternative comparable arrangements.”27  To help transmission customers and third 
parties determine whether the resources they would use to provide RFR service meets the 
comparability standard, transmission providers must post on their OASIS their one-minute and 
10-minute Area Control Error (instantaneous difference between electric energy provided and 
electric energy scheduled) for the last calendar year.28 
D. Obtaining Transmission Service 
When a prospective transmission customer requests service, the transmission provider 
must determine on a non-discriminatory basis whether the service can be offered effectively 
through existing ATC without negatively affecting the electric grid’s reliability or the quality and 
cost of providing service to existing customers.29  If the transmission system’s current ATC is 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
25 Order 764, supra note 6, at 41,498-41,499. 
 
26 See definition of Regulation and Frequency Response, supra note 17. 
 
27 Order 784, supra note 6, at 46,194.  
 
28 Id. at 46,195. 
 
29 PRO FORMA OATT, supra note 9, at §§ 15.2 (firm point-to-point service), 18.4 (non-firm point-to-point 
service), 28.2 (network integration service).  ATC means the transfer capability remaining in the  physical 
transmission network for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses, or such definition as 
contained in Commission-approved Reliability Standards.  18 C.F.R § 37.6(b)(1)(v).  
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not sufficient, the transmission provider must assess and make available options for overcoming 
this problem.30  New or upgraded facilities may be required, but the transmission provider 
temporarily must make available two options to those requesting firm point-to-point service—
redispatching (altering the mix and output of generators in ways that could eliminate congestion 
barriers) and conditional firm service (interrupting service under a limited set of conditions or a 
limited number of hours to obviate a system constraint)31—if they can be offered without 
negatively affecting electric grid reliability.32 
E. Securing Transmission Capacity 
To make existing capacity fully available to prospective transmission customers, the 
FERC allowed point-to-point transmission customers to reassign all or part of their transfer 
capacity to others.33  Originally, the price of reassigned capacity was capped,34 but the FERC 
removed the cap after noting that the market should keep reassignment prices from rising above 
the costs of new or upgraded transmission facilities.35 
Responding to a Congressional mandate,36 the FERC identified several rate incentives 
available to jurisdictional transmission providers in conjunction with qualified expansion or 
upgrading projects, including Return on Equity (ROE) in the upper range of reasonableness, 
100% construction work in progress for prudent construction costs, expensing of pre-commercial 
                                                 
30 PRO FORMA OATT, supra note 9, at §§ 19.3 (point-to-point service), 32.3 (network integration service). 
 
31 Order 890, supra note 6, at 12,382 (defining redispatch and conditional firm service). 
 
32 Id. at 12,382-12,385, 12,387.  PRO FORMA OATT at § 15.4(b). 
 
33 Order 888, supra note 6, at 21,576. 
 
34 Id. 
 
35 Order 739, supra note 6, at 58,296-58,297. 
 
36 Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1241, 119 Stat. 961, codified as Federal Power Act, § 219, 16 U.S.C. § 824s(a), 
(b)(1)-(4), (c), (d). 
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operations costs, hypothetical rate bases, accelerated depreciation, 100% recovery of prudent 
costs of constructing plants abandoned for reasons beyond the applicant’s control, and deferred 
recovery of costs delayed by rate freezes.37  These incentives were also made available on a case-
by-case basis for those proposing to deploy advanced transmission technologies.38 ROE and 
accumulated deferred income tax incentives were provided to Trancos, defined as jurisdictional 
stand-alone transmission companies, regardless of their affiliations with other public utilities.39   
ROE incentives are available on a case-by-case basis to utilities joining TOs.40 
Concerned that future transmission capacity needs were not being planned for efficiently 
and fairly, the FERC mandated that transmission providers engage in “coordinated, open, and 
transparent transmission planning on both a local and regional level,”41 and develop better 
                                                 
37 Order 679, supra note 6, at 43,306-43,316.  
 
38 Order 679, supra note 6, at 43,326-43,327.   Advanced technologies include (1) high-temperature lines; (2) 
underground cables; (3) advanced conductor technology; (4) high-capacity ceramic electric wire, connectors, and 
insulators; (5) optimized transmission line configurations (including multiple phased transmission lines); (6) 
modular equipment; (7) wireless power transmission; (8) ultra high-voltage lines; (9) high-voltage DC technology; 
(10) flexible AC transmission systems; (11) energy storage devices; (12) controllable load; (13) distributed 
generation; (14) enhanced power device monitoring; (15) direct system state sensors; (16) fiber optic technologies; 
(17) power electronics and related software (including real-time monitoring and analytical software); and (18) 
mobile transformers and mobile substations.  42 U.S.C. § 16422.  
 
39 Order 679, supra note 6, at 43,322. 
 
40 Id. at 43,330. 
 
41 Order 890, supra note 6, at 12,320.  The FERC adopted 8 planning principles as guides to what constitutes 
coordinated, open and transparent planning:  (1) Coordination—meeting with stakeholders to develop non-
discriminatory transmission plans, id. at 12,321, 12,322;  (2) Openness—meetings open to all affected parties, id. at 
12,322, 12,323; (3) Transparency—disclosure of the basic criteria, assumptions and data that underlie [the 
transmission provider’s] transmission system plans,” id. at 12,323-12,326 ; (4) Information Exchange—customers 
submit projections of loads and resources, ,” id. at 12,326, 12,327; (5) Comparability—plans must meet service 
requests and treat similarly situated customers comparably, id. at 12,327, 12,328 ; (6) Dispute Resolution—dispute 
resolution mechanisms must be provided, id. at 12,328; (7) Regional Participation—transmission planners within 
interconnected systems must coordinate to share their plans, id. at 12,328-12,332; (8) Congestion Studies—at the 
request of stakeholders, a specified number of meetings must be held annually to address “congestion and/or the 
integration of new resources (including demand resources) and loads.” id. at 12,332-12,335.  
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project cost allocation methods.42  This mandate was later refined to strengthen the regional 
planning requirement;43 add an interregional planning coordination requirement;44 strengthen the 
cost allocation requirement;45 enhance the opportunities for non-incumbent transmission 
developers to undertake new transmission projects;46 and require consideration of transmission 
and non-transmission options for meeting “reliability requirements, addressing economic issues, 
and meeting transmission needs driven by public policy”.47 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The FERC added a 9th Planning Principle:  Cost Allocation—proposals for allocating costs of new projects must 
“fairly assign[ ] costs among participants, including those who cause them to be incurred and those who otherwise 
benefit from them[,] . . . provide[ ] adequate incentives to construct new transmission[, and . . . be) generally 
supported by State authorities and participants across the region.”  Order 890, supra note 6, at 12,335, 12,336. 
 
43 Regional planners must assess whether regional alternatives are superior to local projects and comply with Order 
890’s Planning Principles 1-6, & 8.  Order 1000, supra note 6, at 49, 845, 49,855. 
  
44 Interregional Coordinators  must assess whether interregional projects could be superior to regional projects.  
Order 1000, supra note 6, at 49, 907, 49,913-49,915. 
 
45 Transmission providers were required to develop common regional and interregional cost allocation methods that 
conformed with 6 allocation principles:  (1) Cost Follow Benefits—costs should be allocated to beneficiaries in a 
manner “roughly commensurate” with benefits received, Order 1000, supra note 6, at 49,932, 49,937-49,938; (2) 
Non-Beneficiaries Don’t Pay, id. at 49,939; (3) Benefit/Cost Selection Threshold—benefit/cost thresholds for 
regional or interregional cost allocation must not exceed 1.25 without FERC assent, id. at 49,940-49,941; (4) 
Geographic Limits—costs of facilities should be allocated solely within the region(s) in which they are located, but 
effects on other regions and the costs of mitigated them must be assessed, id. at 49,941-49,942; (5) Transparency in 
Identifying Benefits/Beneficiaries—cost allocations and data for determining a project’s benefits and beneficiaries 
must be documented in a manner that enables stakeholders to understand how they were applied, id. at 49,943; (6) 
Allocation Method Diversity—different cost allocation methods may be used for different types of facilities (e.g., 
those needed for reliability or congestion relief or meeting public policy requirements). Id. at 49,944-49,946. 
  
46 The FERC stripped incumbent transmission providers were stripped of their first-right-of-refusal to develop 
advantage,  Order 1000, supra note 6, at 49,895, 49,896, and required regional planning participates to  (1) establish 
criteria for determining the eligibility of prospective transmission developers to propose transmission projects, id. at 
49,897; (2) identify information that must be submitted in support of transmission projects, id. at 49,897, 49,898; (3) 
use transparent non-discriminatory methods of evaluating the merits of proposed transmission projects for purposes 
of cost allocation,  id. at 49,898; (4) ensure that projects selected for regional cost allocation are actually eligible for 
such cost allocation regardless of who sponsors them, id. at 49,899;  and (5) ensure that all projects are eligible to be 
considered for regional cost allocation.  Id. 
 
47 Order 1000, supra note 6, at 49,868. 
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F. Securing Generator Interconnection  
After OATT regulation began, time-consuming disputes over how to interconnect 
generators to transmission systems began to undermine wholesale electric energy competition.48  
In response, the FERC adopted a pro forma large generator interconnection procedures (LGIP) 
containing a pro forma generation interconnection agreement (LGIA) to standardize how large 
generators (capacity > 20 MW) are interconnected to transmission systems.49 The LGIP is 
designed to ensure that: each interconnection customer is treated fairly;50 the desired 
interconnection service and interconnection points are identified and evaluated to determine their 
feasibility, their impacts on the transmission system, and facilities that must be added or 
upgraded to accommodate the service;51 the parties negotiate agreements specifying how to 
complete the interconnection;52 and required construction is scheduled and rationally 
                                                 
48 Order 2003, supra note 6, at 49,848. 
   
49 Id. at 49,847.  The latest LGIP is FERC, STANDARD LARGE GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES (LGIP), 
available at  Standard Interconnection Agreements & Procedures for Large Generators, FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/gi/stnd-gen.asp (follow Large 
Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) hyperlink) [last visited Aug. 6, 2013] (hereinafter LGIP).  The latest 
LGIA is FERC, STANDARD LARGE GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT (LGIA), available at Standard 
Interconnection Agreements & Procedures for Large Generators, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/gi/stnd-gen.asp (follow Large Generator Interconnection 
Agreement (LGIA) hyperlink) [last visited Aug. 6, 2013] (hereinafter LGIA). 
 
50 LGIP, supra note 49, at 4.1. 
 
51 Id. at §§ 3.2, 3.2.1.1, 3.2.2.1 (describing two types of interconnection service—Energy Resource and Network 
Resource); § 3.3.4 (describing scoping meetings held to identify and evaluate alternative connection points); § 3.5 
(describing process for identifying impacts of project on all affected transmission systems); 6.1-6.4 (describing 
interconnection feasibility study); 8.1-8.5 (describing interconnection facilities study). 
 
52 An optional Engineering & Procurement (E & P) Agreement may be negotiated, LGIP, supra note 49, at § 9.  The 
LGIP mandates the negotiation and execution of an LGIA and specifies how to do it.   Id. at §§ 11.1-11.4. 
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sequenced.53  The LGIA is designed to specify the parties’ rights and obligations with respect to 
completing the interconnection54 and post-interconnection operations.55 
G. Integrating Unconventional Generators:   
The FERC has taken several steps to facilitate the reliable integration of unconventional 
generators to the nation’s electric grid. Finding that small generators (< 20 MW) have less 
revenue earnings potential and are less likely to affect transmission system reliability,56 the 
FERC added to the OATT pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Procedures (SGIP), 
containing a pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement (SGIA), that impose less 
burdensome and expensive interconnection requirements than those of the LGIP and LGIA.57  
                                                 
53 LGIP, supra note 49, at §§ 12.1-12.2.4. 
 
54 LGIA, supra note 49, at art. 3 (Regulatory Filings), 5 (Interconnection Facilities Engineering, Procurement, & 
Construction), 6.1 (Pre-Commercial Operation Date Testing and Modifications), 7.1-7.4 (installation of appropriate 
meters), 8.1-8.2 (installation of communications equipment essential for integrating the operation of the generators 
with the transmission grid). 
 
55 LGIA, supra note 49, at art. 9 (Operations), 10 (Maintenance), 11 (Performance Obligation), 12 (Invoice), 13 
(Emergencies), 14 (Regulatory Requirements and Governing Law), 15 (Notices), 16 (Force Majeure), 17 (Default), 
18 (Indemnity, Consequential Damages and Insurance), 19 (Assignment), 20 (Severability), 21(Comparability), 22 
(Confidentiality), 23 (Environmental Releases), 24 (Information Requirements), 25 (Information Access and Audit 
Rights), 26 (Subcontractors), 27 (Disputes), 28 (Representations, Warranties, and Covenants), 29 (Joint Operating 
Committee), and 30 (Miscellaneous). 
 
56For reliability, see Order 2006, supra note 6, at 34,193 (small wind generator has small impact), 34,198 (size 
matters in evaluating effects generators have on transmission systems).   For small earnings, see id. at 34,194, 
34,195 (emphasizing that small generators are operated by lots of small businesses), 34,200, 34,201 (need to reduce 
costs of dispute resolution process so development of small generators will not be discouraged). 
 
57 The SGIP and SGIA are simplified versions of the LGIP and LGIA, which include a streamlined default study 
process for generators with capacities > 2M, a fast-track process for generators with capacities < 2 MW, and even 
more simplified reliability screens for small (< 10 kW) inverter-based generators.  Order 2006, supra note 6, at 
34,190, 34,194.  “An inverter is a device that converts the direct current voltage and current of a DC generator to 
alternating voltage and current. For example, the output of a solar panel is direct current. The solar panel's output 
must be converted by an inverter to alternating current before it can be interconnected with a utility's alternating 
current electric system.”  Id.  at 34,190 n. 7.  The SGIA provides small generators with reduced insurance 
obligations and streamlined dispute resolution processes. Id. at 34,194-34,195, 34,200-34.201. 
  
The latest SGIP is FERC, SMALL GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES (SGIP), available at  Standard 
Interconnection Agreements & Procedures for Small Generators, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/gi/small-gen.asp  (follow Small Generator Interconnection 
Procedures (SGIP) hyperlink) [last visited Aug. 6, 2013] (hereinafter SGIP).  The latest SGIA is FERC, SMALL 
GENERATOR INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT (SGIA), available at Standard Interconnection Agreements & 
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The SGIP and SGIA provide extremely small generators (< 2 MW) and even smaller (< 10 kW) 
inverter-based generators (those requiring equipment to convert Direct Current into Alternating 
Current) with even less onerous requirements.58   
Large wind-powered generators (> 20 MW) do not run at the same speed as synchronous 
generators, use induction generators, may shutdown during sudden voltage changes, produce 
electric energy at unpredictably variable rates, and are often unmanned and located in remote 
areas.59  In light of these characteristics, the FERC added appendices to the LGIP and LGIA to 
require large wind generators to be able to ride out low-voltage events,60 and have supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) capability of transmitting wind operation data and 
receiving operating instructions from transmission providers.61 
Generators that produce electric energy at unpredictably variable rates have difficulty 
producing electric energy in real time equal to their scheduled hourly output, so it is difficult for 
them to avoid incurring high generator imbalance charges. 62  To mitigate this problem, the 
FERC exempted “intermittent” electric energy sources from the third tier imbalance deviation 
                                                                                                                                                             
Procedures for Small Generators, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/gi/small-gen.asp (follow Small Generator Interconnection 
Agreement (SGIA) hyperlink) [last visited Aug. 6, 2013] (hereinafter SGIA). 
 
58 The fast-track process and the invertor-based process feature, technical screens or a supplemental review to assess 
whether the generators meet reliability and safety requirements.  SGIP, supra note 57, at §§ 2.2.1.1-2.2.1.10, 2.4 
(Supplemental Review); Id. at Attachment 5 (10 kW Inverter Process) § 4.0. 
 
59 Order 661, supra note 6, at 34,994 & n.4 (non-synchronous), 34,996 (induction generators, grid disturbances, 
voltage changes), 35,003 (unpredictable electric energy production rates) & n. 31(unmanned facilities). 
 
60 Interconnection for Wind Energy (Order No. 661-A), 70 Fed. Reg. 75,005, 75,008-75,009  (Dec. 12, 2005) 
[hereinafter Order 661-A]; LGIA, supra note 49, at Appendix G: Interconnection Requirements for a Wind 
Generating Plant, Part A.i, Post-Transition Period LVRT Standard ¶ 1. 
 
61 Order 661, supra note 6, at 35,002-35,004.  LGIA, supra note 49, at Appendix G:  Interconnection Requirements 
for a Wind Generating Plant, Part A.iii. 
 
62 Order 890,  supra note 6, at 12,349. 
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band and limited their imbalance charges to those calculated by applying the second tier charges 
to deviations greater than the larger of 1.5% or 2 MW.63   
Variable energy resources (VERs) are electric energy sources that are powered by 
renewable energy, produce electric energy that cannot be stored, and have variability in output 
that cannot be controlled by the operator.64  To make the integration of VERs more efficient and 
reliable, the FERC modified the LGIA to require operators of large VERs (> 20 MW) to provide 
site-specific meteorological and forced outage data to transmission providers so they can develop 
and deploy more accurate power production forecasting methods.65  Wind-powered VERs are 
required at minimum to report data on temperature, wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric 
pressure.66  Solar-powered VERs are required at minimum to report data on temperature, 
atmospheric pressure and irradiance.67 
III. Operational Unbundling:  Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) 
After about 3 years of OATT regulation, the FERC issued rules to encourage the 
operational unbundling of VIUs through the formation of ISOs/RTOs.68  It did so out of concern 
                                                 
63 Id. 
 
64 Order 674, supra note 6, at 41,482 n.1, 41516.  Examples include “wind, solar thermal and photovoltaic, and 
hydrokinetic generating facilities.”  Id. at 41,482 n.1. 
 
65 Order 674, supra note 6, at 41,508, 41,110, 41,111. 
 
66 Id. at 41,509, 41,512. 
 
67 Id. at 41,509, 41,512. 
 
68 Order 2000, supra note 7.  Currently, there are 7 RTOs/ISOs operating along the lines described infra at 
Operational Unbundling—RTOs through RTO Reforms.  Four are multi-state RTOs, including:  ISO-New England, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/ (operates throughout Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
and Vermont); PJM, http://www.pjm.com/home.aspx (operates throughout Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, West 
Virginia and Virginia; in most of Ohio and Pennsylvania;  in parts of Illinois, Indiana,  and North Carolina; and in 
fragmentary parts of Kentucky, Michigan and Tennessee); Midwest ISO (MISO), 
https://www.misoenergy.org/Pages/Home.aspx (operates throughout Wisconsin, most of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Michigan, Minnesota, and North Dakota; parts of Missouri, Montana, and South Dakota; and fragmentary parts of 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming); Southwest Power Pool (SPP), 
http://www.spp.org/section.asp?pageid=1 (operates throughout Kansas and Oklahoma; most of Nebraska; in parts of 
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that OATT regulation was insufficient to handle engineering and economic problems emerging 
from rapid growth in market transactions and increased interconnections among transmission 
systems.69  The FERC was also concerned that VIUs still had incentives to operate their 
transmission systems in discriminatory ways that may be hard to detect and cannot be prevented 
without heavy-handed regulation.70  
To the FERC, effective RTOs have 4 essential characteristics.  They are: Independence—
being beyond the control of electric energy market participants with respect to how transmission 
services are provided;71 Regional Scope—having a regional footprint sufficient for effectively 
maintaining grid reliability and promoting efficient and fair electric energy markets;72 Exclusive 
Operational Authority— having exclusive control over the operations of all transmission systems 
within its region;73 Short-term Reliability—having exclusive control over operations essential to 
maintaining reliability of the integrated grid.74 
                                                                                                                                                             
Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas).  Three are ISOs operating in the nation’s 3 largest states:   
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), http://www.nyiso.com/public/index.jsp; Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT), http://www.ercot.com/; and California ISO (CAISO), 
http://www.caiso.com/Pages/default.aspx.  Information about where these RSOs/ITOs operate can be found at 
FERC, REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS (RTO)/INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATORS (ISO), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter RTO-ISO] 
 
69 Order 2000, supra note 7, at 811, 813-815, 823-825.  
 
70 Id. at 823-825. 
 
71 Id. at 842, 850-859. 
 
72 Id. at 859-864.   In assessing the adequacy of an RTO’s boundaries, the FERC said it would consider the whether 
the boundaries (1) facilitate the performance of essential RTO functions and the achievement of RTO goals, (2), 
encompass one contiguous geographic area,  (3) encompass a highly interconnected portion of the grid, (4) deter the 
exercise of market power, (5) recognize trading patterns, (6) take into account existing regional boundaries (e.g., 
NERC regions) to the extent consistent with the Commission’s goals for RTOs, (7) encompass existing regional 
transmission entities, (8) encompass existing control areas, and  (9) take into account international boundaries.  Id. at 
863-864. 
 
73  An RTO has sufficient operational authority if it has the authority to control the key transmission functions of the 
transmission facilities under its control and assumes the responsibility for being the security coordinator for its 
region. Order 2000, supra note 7, at 866, 867.  Key transmission functions over which the RTO must have 
operational authority include “switching transmission elements into and out of operation in the transmission system 
(e.g., transmission lines and transformers), monitoring and controlling real and reactive power flows, monitoring and 
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The FERC also believe effective RTOs must be capable of performing 8 essential 
functions.  They are: (1) administer its own tariff and employ a transmission pricing system that 
will promote efficient use and expansion of transmission and generation facilities; (2) create 
market mechanisms to manage transmission congestion; (3) develop and implement procedures 
to address parallel path flow issues; (4) serve as a supplier of last resort for all ancillary services 
required in Order No. 888 and subsequent orders; (5) operate a single OASIS site for all 
transmission facilities under its control with responsibility for independently calculating TTC 
and ATC; (6) monitor markets to identify design flaws and market power; (7) plan and 
coordinate necessary transmission additions and upgrades, and (8) engage in interregional 
coordination.75 
A. RTO Ratemaking Guidelines 
From its belief that RTOs’ success depends on the “feasibility and vitality of the stand-
alone transmission business,” the FERC issued transmission ratemaking guidelines to insure that 
RTOs implement efficient and fare pricing of transmission services. 76  The guidelines call for 
(1) eliminating pancaked rates so that electric energy transactions with long-distance contract 
paths will not be burdened by each affected transmission system imposing an access charge;77 
                                                                                                                                                             
controlling voltage levels, and scheduling and operating reactive resources…. As security coordinator, the RTO will 
assume responsibility for: (1) performing load-flow and stability studies to anticipate, identify and address security 
problems; (2) exchanging security information with local and regional entities; (3) monitoring real-time operating 
characteristics such as the availability of reserves, actual power flows, interchange schedules, system frequency and 
generation adequacy; and (4) directing actions to maintain reliability, including firm load shedding.”  Id. at 867.   
 
74 This means that the RTO must have exclusive authority over interchange scheduling, redispatching to ensure grid 
reliability, and transmission maintenance approval.  Order 2000, supra note 7, at 874, 875. 
 
75 Order 2000, supra note 7, at 876 (list), 876–877 (discussion of Tariff Administration and Design), 877–888 (discussion of 
Congestion Management), 888–890 (discussion of Parallel Path Flow), 890–897 (discussion of Ancillary Services), 897–898 
(discussion of OASIS, TTC, and ATC), 898–905 (discussion of Market Monitoring), 905–910 (discussion of Planning and 
Expansion), 910–911 (discussion of Interregional Coordination). 
 
76 Order 2000, supra note 7, at 913 
 
77 Id. at 915. 
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(2) waiving access charges between RTOs to facilitate electric energy transactions with contract 
paths crossing the borders of two or more RTOs;78 (3) flexibly permitting the use of license plate 
rates so customers pay a single charge to access the entire RTO grid but the rates may differ by 
location of contract paths so they will enable each affected transmission system to recover its 
fixed costs;79 (4) developing congestion pricing methods, such as locational marginal pricing 
(LMP) backed by financial transmission rights (FTRs), that ensure least-cost dispatching of 
generators and allocate limited transfer capacity to those who value it the most;80 and (5) 
encouraging the adoption of a performance based rate (PBR) systems encompassing performance 
benchmarks, rewards and penalties to create incentives for the RTOs to deliver high quality 
transmission services.81   
B. RTO Spot Markets   
To provide participants with a measure of price and supply certainty, RTOs offer a multi-
settlement system comprised of a day-ahead spot market (DAM) and a real-time spot market 
(RTM).82  In the DAM, bids are received on an hour-by-hour basis for supplying and purchasing 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
78 Id. at 916. 
 
79 Id. at 917.   
 
80 Id. at 887, 917.   
 
81 Order 2000, supra note7, at 920-922.  The FERC issued 5 guidelines for RTOs wishing to file PBR proposals: (1) 
PBR should not be applied piecemeal; (2) PBR should encompass both rewards and penalties; (3) PBR rewards and 
penalties should create incentives for an RTO to make efficient operating and investment decisions, and should not 
compromise system reliability; (4) the benefits of PBR should be shared between the RTO and its customers; To the 
extent possible, the rewards and penalties should be prescribed in advance based on known and measurable 
benchmarks.   Id. at 921-922. 
 
82 All the RTOs/ISOs but SPP operate Day-Ahead and Real-Time wholesale electric energy markets.  SPP will 
commence operating both markets on March 1, 2014.  See ISO-New England, WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS-
THE MULTI-SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/smd_overview/index-
p3.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); PJM, ENERGY MARKET, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-
operations/energy.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); MISO, DAY-AHEAD, 
https://www.misoenergy.org/MarketsOperations/MarketInformation/Pages/DayAhead.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 
2013); MISO, REAL-TIME AND OPERATING RESERVES MARKET, 
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electric energy the following day that is not acquired by receivers through bilateral contracts and 
self-generation.83  These bids determine at each point of receipt and point of delivery within the 
grid the marginal cost of the last unit of electricity for which there is a willing supplier and a 
willing buyers (LMPs).84  If there is congestion within the grid, the LMPs will be different at 
many locations to reflect the inability to supply congested locations with electric energy from the 
lowest-priced generators.85  At congested points, the LMP paid by purchasers in the receiving 
area equals the bid for the last unit supplied by the higher priced generator, but the LMP paid by 
the generators in preferred sending area equals the bid for the last unit capable of being delivered 
to the receiving area.86  The congestion cost of delivering electric energy equals the difference 
between the LMP in the receiving area minus the LMP in the sending area.87  At the close of the 
DAM, generators providing bilateral contract supplies and self-generation supplies are cleared 
for dispatch based on the terms of transmission service contracts and the willingness of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
https://www.misoenergy.org/MarketsOperations/MarketInformation/Pages/RealTimeMarket.aspx (last visited Aug. 
1, 2013); SPP will offer both Day-Ahead and a Real-Time markets commencing March 1, 2014, SPP, ABOUT THE 
MARKET PLACE, http://www.spp.org/section.asp?pageID=143 (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); NYISO, ABOUT NYISO: 
THE ENERGY MARKETS, 
http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/energy_market/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 1, 
2013); ERCOT, DAY-AHEAD MARKET, http://www.ercot.com/mktinfo/dam/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); ERCOT, 
REAL-TIME MARKET, http://www.ercot.com/mktinfo/rtm/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); CAISO, MARKET PROCESSES, 
http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/MarketProcesses.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
 
There are variations among these markets.  However, they mostly follow the pattern outlined by the FERC in 
Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market 
Design (NOPR), 67 Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,503 (July 31, 2002) [hereinafter SMD].   
 
83 SMD, supra note 82, at 55,489-55,491. 
 
84 Id. at 55,490, 55,491. 
 
85 Id. at 55,480, 55,490.  
 
86 Id. at 55,480. 
 
87 Id.  See also ISO-New England, FTRS AND ARRS:  WHAT ARE FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/ftrs_arrs/index.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter 
FTRS]. 
 
Allison-Page 20 of 30 
 
receivers to pay any relevant congestion charges.88  Generators supplying those who successfully 
purchased electric energy in the spot market are also cleared for dispatch.89  The relevant LMPs 
are paid to scheduled spot market suppliers and paid by scheduled spot market purchasers.90  
Congestion costs are paid by those scheduled to receive electric energy pursuant to bilateral 
contracts and self-generation.91   
The RTM is an electric energy spot market in which deviations from the quantities of 
electric energy scheduled to be produced and received in DAM are resolved at real-time LMPs.92  
Suppliers receive/pay real-time LMP for their over/under production.93  Receivers receive/pay 
real-time LMP and congestion costs for their under/over receipt of electric energy.94   
C. Congestion Management:   
Most electric energy delivered by RTOs is either purchased by receivers through bilateral 
transactions or produced by generators owned by VIUs.95   For these situations, the price of 
electric energy is a bilateral contract price or the cost of generation rather than the receiving area 
LMP,96 and the total delivered price of electric energy is the contract price or generation cost 
                                                 
88 SMD, supra note 82, at 55,487, 55,488 
 
89 Id. 
 
90 Id. at 55,491. 
 
91 See id. at 55,481,  55,487, 55,488.  However, ISO-New England apparently requires spot market purchasers who 
pay congested LMPs to also pay congestion costs.  See, England, LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING: NODE, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/lmp/index-p2.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter 
LMP-NODE] 
 
92 SMD, supra note 82, at 55,482, 55,483,  55,492, 55,493.  
 
93 Id. at 55,493. 
 
94 Id. 
 
95 Id. at 55,483, 55,489. 
 
96 Id. at 55,480, 55483 & n. 130. 
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plus the transmission charge and the congestion charge calculated in the DAM.97  For receivers 
in congested receiving areas who purchased electric energy in the DAM, the total delivered price 
of electricity is the receiving area LMP plus the transmission charge.98 
The increased cost in the price of delivered electric energy at congested receiving areas 
provides market signals that allocate the constricted ATC to suppliers willing to take a price 
equal to the sending area’s LMP and receivers willing to pay the receiving area’s LMP price of 
delivered electric energy.99  Thus, LMP insures that electric energy flows on congested pathways 
do not exceed the constricted ATC by using market signals that allocate constricted ATC to 
those who value it the most.100  Over time, these price signals encourage the construction of new 
transmission capacity to relieve the congestion.101 
D. Financial Transmission Rights:   
FTRs entitle their holders to receive, or obligate them to pay, a per megawatt share of 
transmission congestion revenue that is collected hourly on energy flows in one direction within 
congested areas.102  They are hedges against the payment of congestion charges when the FTR 
holder is a receiver of delivered energy in a receiving area with an LMP that higher than the 
sending area LMP.103  Initial allotments were given to existing transmission customers based on 
                                                 
97 Id. at 55483 & n. 130; LMP-NODE, supra note 91. 
 
98 SMD, supra note 82, at 55,487, 55,488; LMP-NODE, supra note 91. 
 
99 SMD, supra note 82, at 55,480. 
  
100 Id. at 55,480, 55,487 & n. 139, 55,488. 
 
101 ISO-New England, LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING: WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS?,   http://www.iso-
ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/lmp/index-p4.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
 
102 FTRS, supra note 87. 
 
103 Id. 
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their historic usage,104 and FTRs representing the remaining ATC, if any, were made available 
through auctions to new transmission customers or investors.105 If new transmission capacity is 
added to the RTO grid, the aggregate amount of FTRs can be increased by an amount equal to 
the increase in ATC.106  Transmission customers who paid the construction costs of the new 
transmission facilities will be issued FTRs equal to the additional ATC.107  
Revenues collected from the auctioning of FTRs are distributed through Auction 
Revenue Rights (ARRs).108  ARRs are allocated first to entities that pay for transmission 
expansions and upgrades that add ATC to the RTO grid.109  Remaining ARRs are allocated to 
transmission customers who serve electric energy end-users (Load Serving Entities—LSEs) in 
relation to the amount of load served and where congestion occurs.110 
E. Firm Long-term Transmission Rights  
Initially, RTOs offered FTRs with maximum terms of only 1 year.111  This created 
congestion cost uncertainty that hampered the financing of large generators and other long-term 
electric energy supply arrangements.112   So Congress directed the FERC to ensure that LSEs 
with long-term electric energy supply arrangements could obtain long-term firm transmission 
                                                 
104 See SMD, supra note 84, at 55,484; FTRS, supra note 87; Order 681, supra note 7, at 43,565. 
 
105 SMD, supra note 84, at 55,484, 55,486, 55,487; FTRS, supra note 87. 
 
106 See SMD, supra note 84, at 55,484. 
 
107 Id. 
 
108 ISO-New England, FTRS AND ARRS:  AUCTION REVENUE RIGHTS,  http://www.iso-
ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/ftrs_arrs/index-p2.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter ARRS] 
 
109 Id. 
 
110 Id. 
 
111 See Order 681, supra note 7, at 43,566. 
 
112 See id. 
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rights from RTOs.113  Accordingly, the FERC required RTOs to offer long-term FTRs with a 
term of at least 10 years,114 establish renewal policies supportive of long-term supply 
arrangements,115 and support additional ATC to accommodate new long-term transmission 
rights.116 
F. RTO Reforms:   
The FERC found that further transparency in long-term electric energy markets would 
facilitate the formation of long-term electric energy contracts and reduce possible over-reliance 
on spot markets.117  Accordingly, the FERC required RTOs to establish on their websites a 
“bulletin board” on which electric energy market participants can post offers to buy and sell 
electric energy on a long-term basis.118 
To make RTOs more responsive to customers and stakeholders, the FERC required them 
to “establish a means for customers and other stakeholders to have a form of direct access to the 
board of directors.”119  The FERC also ordered RTOs and ISOs to submit compliance filings that 
will be assessed in terms of their inclusiveness, fairness in balancing diverse interests, 
                                                 
113 Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1233(b), 119 Stat. 960, which required FERC to carry out the mandate of the newly created 
FPA § 217(b)(4), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824q(b)(4), to enable “load-serving entities to secure firm transmission rights (or 
equivalent tradable or financial rights) on a long-term basis for long-term power supply arrangements made, or planned, to 
[satisfy their service obligations.” 
 
114 Order 681, supra note 7, at 43,575, 43,591, 43,592.  The FERC also mandated that firm long-term transmission 
rights must be firm physically and financially.  Id. at 43,574, 43,575. 
 
115 Order 681, supra note 7, at 43,588, 43,591, 43,592. 
 
116 To this end, the FERC required transmission providers to adopt planning and expansion practices that will take 
into account the transmission providers’ obligation to provide long-term transmission rights that are firm physically 
and financially.  Order 681, supra note 7, at 43,612, 43,613. 
 
117 Order 719, supra note 7, at 64,133, 63,134. 
 
118 Id. at 64,136, 64,137. 
 
119 Id. at 64,154. 
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representation of minority positions, and ongoing responsiveness.120  RTOs were further required 
to publish their mission statements and/or charters on their websites,121 and encouraged to make 
stakeholder/customer responsiveness a factor in setting RTO executive compensation.122 
Demand resources—the ability of electric energy end-users to reduce or curtail their 
consumption in response to economic incentives123—were encountering barriers to providing 
balancing services by participating in RTO spot markets.124  So, the FERC issued mandates 
requiring the RTOs to treat demand response resources in ways comparable to their treatment of 
energy supply resources.125  Later, the FERC ordered RTOs to pay demand resources on the 
same basis they pay generators—the market price for energy (LMP)—if they have the capability 
to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource and their dispatch will 
not cause electric energy purchasers’ bills to go up.126 
The FERC also found that some RTO methods for compensating providers of frequency 
regulation (FR)—injecting or withdrawing electric energy to keep system frequency at 60 Hz—
                                                 
120 Id. at 64,157. 
 
121 Id. at 64,162. 
 
122 Id. 
 
123 See Order 719, supra note 7, at 64,103 & n. 14. 
 
124 Id. at 64,103. 
 
125 Id. at 64,104, 64,107.  However, comparable treatment extends only to demand resources that “(1) are technically 
capable of providing the ancillary service and meet the necessary technical requirements; and (2) submit a bid under 
the generally-applicable bidding rules at or below the market-clearing price”  Id.  To ensure that demand response is 
treated comparably, RTOs were required “to allow demand response resources to specify limits on the duration, 
frequency, and amount of their service in their bids,” id. at 64,110; exempt buyers from imbalance charges if they 
took less electric energy in a real-time market period than they scheduled in the day-ahead market in response to 
RTO calls for help in meeting operating reserves shortages, id. at 64,114 ; and allow aggregators of retail customers 
(ARCs) to enter demand response bids on behalf of their customers if the ARC bids meet the same requirements as 
others, are verifiable, and do not run afoul of legal prohibitions.  Id. at 64,119, 64120.   
 
126 Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,666-16,669. 
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were discriminatory and inefficient.127  As a consequence, the FERC required RTOs to select PR 
providers through a bid-based spot market involving a 2-part market clearing price that pays for 
PR capacity based on the PR providers’ cross-product and inter-temporal opportunity costs and 
PR performance based on response speed and accuracy and the amount service provided.128 
IV. Controlling Electric Energy Market Power 
Market power is the power to raise electric energy prices above the competitive level.129  
Therefore, the FERC subjects electric energy providers (sellers) to market mitigation and will not 
allow them to seek or bid market based rates (MBR) if they have market power in horizontal or 
vertical markets,130 violate affiliation restrictions,131 or violate market behavior rules.132  Market 
mitigation is also used in times of grid disruptions that create  electric energy supply 
shortages.133 
A. Market Mitigation    
Market mitigation price constraints are imposed on electric energy providers (sellers) 
found to have horizontal market power.134  Such sellers may accept default mitigation or propose 
mitigation more tailored to their circumstances.135  Default mitigation prices are the incremental 
                                                 
127 This was because resources are compensated at the same level even when providing different amounts of 
frequency regulation service. Order 755, supra note 7, at 67,268. 
 
128 Order 755, supra note 7, at 67,270, 67,272, 67,273 (capacity part); 67,273,  67,276, 67,278, 67,279 (performance 
part).   
 
129 SMD, supra note 82, at 55,542, 55,503. 
 
130 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,907-39,909. 
 
131 Id. at 39,908. 
 
132 Market Behavior Order-Appendix A, supra note 8, at 65,923, 65,924; Order 674, supra note 8, at 9695-9697. 
 
133 Order 719, supra note  7, at 64,124, 64,125. 
 
134 18 C.F.R § 35.38(a). 
 
135 Id. 
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cost plus 10 percent for sales no more than one week,  an embedded “up to” rate reflecting the 
costs of the unit(s) expected to provide service for sales greater than one week but less than one 
year,  and an embedded cost rate for sales over one year.136 
After reviewing supply shortage mitigation practices, the FERC ordered RTOs to reform 
them out of concern that price or bid caps were not accurately reflecting the true value of energy 
in times of shortage.137  The FERC offered 4 reform approaches, including: (1) increasing energy 
supply and demand bid caps only during emergencies; (2) increasing only demand bid caps 
during times of emergencies; (3) establishing a demand curve for operating reserves that would 
raise bid prices in a previously agreed-to way in the facing of declining reserves; and (4) setting 
market clearing prices during emergencies for all dispatched supply and demand resources equal 
to payments made to participants in an emergency demand response program.138 
B. Horizontal Market Power 
Sellers are deemed to have market power in wholesale electric energy markets 
(Horizontal Market Power) if they have dominant market positions or are pivotal suppliers.139  A 
seller has a dominant market position if its share is > 20%  as measured by the MW of 
uncommitted capacity owned or controlled by the seller as compared to the total uncommitted 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
136 18 C.F.R § 35.38(b)(1)-(3). 
 
137 Order 719, supra note 7, at 64,124. 
 
138 Id. at 64,126, 64,129.  The FERC also established criteria for assessing the merits of shortage pricing rules, 
including whether they:  (1) “Improve reliability by reducing demand and increasing generation during periods of 
operating reserve shortage;” (2) “Make it more worthwhile for customers to invest in demand response 
technologies;” (3) “Encourage existing generation and demand resources to continue to be relied upon during an 
operating reserve shortage;” (4) “Encourage entry of new generation and demand resources;” (5) “Ensure that the 
principle of comparability in treatment of and compensation to all resources is not discarded during periods of 
operating reserve shortage;” and  (6) “Ensure market power is mitigated and gaming behavior is deterred during 
periods of operating reserve shortages including, but not limited to, showing how demand resources discipline 
bidding behavior to competitive levels.” Id. at 64,130, 64,131.  
 
139 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,909, 39,912, 39,913; 18 C.F.R. § 35.37(c)(1). 
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capacity in the relevant market.140   A seller is a pivotal supplier if at the time of annual peak for 
the balancing authority area “demand cannot be met without some contribution . . . by the seller 
or its affiliates.”141  If the seller fails either of the foregoing tests, it may demonstrate that it lacks 
market power through a delivered price test (DPT).142  DPT more robustly determines the 
seller’s market share and whether it is a pivotal supplier and uses a market concentration factor 
(based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI = sum of the squares of each seller’s market 
share).143  Under the DPT, the seller lacks market power if it is not a pivotal supplier, and has a 
market share < 20% in a market with an HHI < 2500.144 
C. Vertical Market Power.  
Vertical market power involves using control over transmission or other critical resources 
to gain advantage in electric energy markets.145  Operating transmission facilities under an 
OATT mitigates transmission market power.146  The FERC monitors sellers’ ownership or 
control over intrastate natural gas transportation, intrastate natural gas storage or distribution 
facilities, sites for generation capacity development, and sources of coal supplies and the 
transportation of coal supplies such as barges and rail cars.147 
 
                                                 
140 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,909, 39,916. 
 
141 Id. at 39,909. 
 
142 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,917, 39,918; 18 C.F.R. § 35.37(c)(3). 
 
143 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,918. 
 
144 Id. 
 
145 Id. at 39,908. 
 
146 Id. at 39,953; 18 C.F.R. § 35.37(d).  However, violation of OATT requirements can result in a denial or 
revocation of the right to charge market based rates.  Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,954-39,957. 
 
147 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,958; 18 C.F.R. § 35.37(e)(1)-(4). 
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D. Affiliate Restrictions 
Franchised utilities with captive customers and its electric energy sales affiliates must 
abide by affiliate restrictions regulation in order to seek MBR.148  Utilities and their affiliates 
must function separately except in times of emergency,149 and refrain from sharing market 
information that could harm captive customers,150 making preferential sales of non-power goods 
or services to one another,151 offering preferential power brokering services to one another,152 
and using a conduit as a means of circumventing the affiliate restrictions.153 
E. Preventing Market Manipulation   
The most egregious forms of market manipulation include: Wash Trading—“pre-
arranged offsetting trades of the same product among the same parties . . . that involve no 
economic risk, and no net change in beneficial ownership;” Physical Withholding—falsely 
declaring that a facility has been forced out of service; Economic Withholding—deliberately 
submitting high bids in excess of applicable caps and the likely market clearing price; 
Availability Misinformation—failing to create and report a proper outage schedule and to give 
immediate notice of any capacity or resource changes that could affect dispatching; 
Inaccurate/Misleading Reporting—giving false and misleading date to industry publications and 
market monitors; Dysfunctional Resource Bidding/Scheduling—bidding or scheduling resources 
                                                 
148 Order 697, supra note 8, at 39,960. 
 
149 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a), (c)(1)(2)(i)-(iii). 
 
150 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a), (d)(1), (2). 
 
151 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a), (e)(1), (2). 
 
152 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a), (f)(1)(i)-(iii), (2)(i)-(iii). 
 
153 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a), (g). 
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that are not physically capable of supplying the needed services.154  The FERC responded to 
these activities by promulgated market manipulation rules,155 and market behavior rules.156 It 
                                                 
154 Market Behavior Order, supra note 8, at 65,907, 65,908 (wash trading); SMD, supra note 84, at 55,509, 55,510 
(the rest). 
 
155 The market manipulation rules prohibit any entity engaged in the purchase or sale of electric energy or 
transmission service (1) To use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity.  18 C.F.R. § 1c.2(a)(1)-(3).  
These rules were adopted in Order 670, supra note 8, at 4258, in response to response to new a new Congressional 
mandate to promulgate rules making it unlawful to use any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
conjunction with the purchase/sale of electric energy or transmission services.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1283, 
now codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824v. 
 
156 (a) Unit operation. Where a Seller participates in a Commission-approved organized market, Seller must operate 
and schedule generating facilities, undertake maintenance, declare outages, and commit or otherwise bid supply in a 
manner that complies with the Commission -approved rules and regulations of the applicable market. A Seller is not 
required to bid or supply electric energy or other electricity products unless such requirement is a part of a separate 
Commission-approved tariff or is a requirement applicable to Seller through Seller’s participation in a Commission-
approved organized market.  
(b)  Communications. A Seller must provide accurate and factual information and not submit  false or misleading 
information, or omit material information, in any communication with the Commission, Commission-approved 
market monitors, Commission-approved regional transmission organizations, Commission-approved independent 
system operators, or jurisdictional transmission providers, unless Seller exercises due diligence to prevent  such 
occurrences.  
(c) Price reporting. To the extent a Seller engages in reporting of transactions to publishers of electric or natural gas 
price indices, Seller must provide accurate and factual information, and not knowingly submit false or misleading 
information or omit material information to any such publisher, by reporting its transactions in a manner consistent 
with the procedures set forth in the Policy Statement on Natural Gas and Electric Price Indices, issued by the 
Commission in Docket No. PL03-3-000, and any clarifications thereto. Seller must identify as part of its Electric 
Quarterly Report filing requirement in § 35.10b of this chapter the publishers of electricity and natural gas indices to 
which it reports its transactions. In addition, Seller must adhere to any other standards and requirements for price 
reporting as the Commission may order.  
(d)  Records retention. A Seller must retain, for a period of five years, all data and information upon which it billed 
the prices it charged for the electric energy or electric energy products it sold pursuant to Seller’s market-based rate 
tariff, and the prices it reported for use in price indices. 
 
18 C.F.R. § 35.41(a)-(d). 
 
Originally, the FERC adopted 6 Market Behavior Rules that were designed to prevent practices that caused extreme 
disturbances in the Western markets in 2001-2002.  Market Behavior Order, supra note 8, at 65,902.  After the 
adoption of the Market Manipulation Rules, the FERC eliminated 2 of the original 6 Market Behavior Rules and 
codified the remaining 4 as shown above.  Order 674, supra. note 8, at 9,695-9,697. 
18 C.F.R. § 35.41(a)-(d). 
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also required RTOs to establish market monitoring units (MMUs) and give them the 
independence, authority and investigatory tools required to perform their functions.157. 
V. Concluding Observations 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this survey of how U.S. electric energy regulation 
evolved from natural monopoly regulation to regulated competition.  First, regulated competition 
is more complex than natural monopoly regulation, and imposes more technically difficult tasks 
and transaction costs on the regulated community.  Second, the principle goal of regulated 
competition seems to be putting resources in the hands of those willing and able to pay the most 
for them in the belief that reliable service at just and reasonable prices will be the natural 
byproducts.  Third, it is debatable how much true support there is for regulated competition 
among end-users, state officials and other stakeholders, for to date RTOs do not operate in all or 
parts of 28 states located in the South, the Plains and the West,158 and only 15 states have 
implemented actively the retail choice version of it.159 
                                                 
157 Order 719, supra note 7, at 64,139.  To enhance their independence, MMUs report to the RTO board instead of to 
its management.  Id. at 64,140.  MMU personnel may not have any financial or professional interests in electric 
energy market participants.   Id. at 64,144-64,145.  MMUs core tasks include evaluating “market rules, tariff 
provisions and market design elements;” reviewing and reporting on electric energy market performance; and 
identifying and reporting the behavior of market participants that warrants an investigation.   Id. at 64,141.  MMUs 
must also issue state-of-the-market reports quarterly and annually.  Id. at 64,148.  
 
158 RTOs do not operate at all 12 states, including: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah and Washington.  RTOs do not operate in most of 9 states, 
including:  Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Wyoming.  RTOs do not operate in parts of 3 states, including California, Iowa and Missouri.  RTOs do not operate 
in fragmentary parts of 4 states, including:  Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Texas.  See RTO-ISO, supra 
note 68. 
  
159 These states include:  Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Texas.  Washington, D.C. has 
also adopted Retail Choice.  United States Energy Information Administration, Status of Electricity Restructuring by 
State, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013). 
